Abstract-In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), diagnosis is a crucial and challenging task due to the distributed nature and stringent resources. Most previous approaches are supervised, relying on a-priori knowledge of network faults. On the other hand, our experience with GreenOrbs, a long-term large-scale WSN system, reveals the need of diagnosis in an agnostic manner.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been widely used in many fields, such as environmental surveillance, emergency navigation, traffic monitoring, and industrial control [15] [16] [22] . WSNs are by nature error-prone and have unsatisfactory reliability, encountering various faults and failures during their operation. Consequently, diagnosis has drawn substantial attention in recent years as a method to enhance the applicability, reliability, and efficiency of WSNs.
However, diagnosing WSNs is a challenging issue because, once a WSN is deployed, its inner conditions are not directly observable. Specifically, since many WSNs reside in harsh or remote environments, it is difficult to perform in-situ troubleshooting on the faulty nodes. Furthermore, the distributed nature and stringent resources of WSNs render it hard for a network operator to completely monitor the system's working status. Due to similar reasons, it is also infeasible to deploy management tools like SNMP, or other costly diagnostic modules, on the sensor nodes.
Many existing diagnostic approaches are supervised, i.e., they rely on either specific rules or inference models. An obvious drawback is that they are limited to faults with known types and symptoms, and hence, they cannot be easily generalized to different application scenarios. On the other hand, the interactions within the WSN and the causal dependencies between root causes and symptoms are usually unknown. As a result, silent failures remain undetected. This paper is motivated by the need for long-term reliable operation of GreenOrbs, a large-scale WSN system in a forest [16] . Currently, GreenOrbs includes 330 nodes and has been in continuous operation for over eight months. During the deployment, we often observe system performance degradations, e.g., low packet delivery ratio. A portion of faulty nodes can be easily identified since they generate apparently abnormal system metrics (e.g., measurements that are clearly beyond the reasonable scope). The other faulty nodes, however, cannot be identified in this way. For instance, we adopt low power listening mode so the radio is switched on only for receiving, sending, or idle listening. Consequently, the radio-on time should be closely correlated with the amount of traffic passing the node. We noted that during a five-minute period, a node kept its radio on for 47.5 seconds, transmitting only 3 packets in total. In the next five-minute period, it kept its radio on for 51.6 seconds and transmitted 550 packets. Any individual value of the metrics is not abnormal, but the correlation between radio-on time and number of transmitted packets clearly suggests inconsistency on that node.
A straightforward solution would be to develop a set of static correlation rules for identifying the faulty nodes. However, this is inapplicable for two reasons: (i) usually there is insufficient domain knowledge to enumerate all the rules; (ii) WSN deployment is often evolutional, so that the correlation rules change over time; both software upgrades and environment conditions may have a great impact on the correlations.
To overcome these problems, we propose Agnostic Diagnosis (AD), an online lightweight approach for WSNs. AD exploits the correlations among metrics of each sensor using a correlation graph that describes the latent status of the node. Such a correlation graph is updated periodically using the node's metrics. By mining through the correlation graphs, we identify the underlying rules of a normally running system, and detect abnormal correlations.
Time (a) Number of packets transmitted by node 2 in two time periods Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• Unlike previous approaches, Agnostic Diagnosis relies on minimal a-priori knowledge and can be generalized to a wide variety of WSN applications.
• We propose the correlation graph, a compact structure that efficiently characterizes the internal correlations inside a node.
• We implement AD and evaluate it with traces from a 330-node GreenOrbs deployment. Case studies and statistics demonstrate the effectiveness of AD.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the problem. Section 3 presents AD. Section 4 evaluates our design and Section 5 surveys related work. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
II.

MOTIVATION
Diagnosis is a fundamental task for long-term large-scale WSN systems. This section first introduces the basic information and application requirements of GreenOrbs, including several observations in the form of concrete examples. These observations reveal the existence of correlation patterns among the nodes' operational metrics and the feasibility of agonistic diagnosis.
A. GreenOrbs
GreenOrbs is an ecological surveillance project deployed in a forest. It collects a group of sensory data such as temperature, humidity, illumination and carbon dioxide concentration to support various applications. Since the deployment is in a remote area, the overhead of in-situ debugging and troubleshooting is very high. Therefore, the diagnostic system is designed so that each node periodically transmits its current status to the sink. Specifically, we collect 22 types of metrics from each node that are classified into four categories: (1) timing metrics e.g. RadioOnTimeCounter, which denotes the accumulative radio-on time; (2) traffic metrics, e.g. TransmitCounter, which records the accumulative number of packets transmitted by a node; (3) task metrics, e.g. TaskExecCounter, which is the accumulative number of tasks executed; (4) other metrics such as ParentChangeCounter, which counts the number of parent changes.
The difficulty of diagnosis in GreenOrbs stems from the absence of a-priori knowledge on the possible faults and their symptoms, which renders general diagnostic rules inapplicable. Instead, we design a diagnostic system requiring minimal domain knowledge.
B. Observations
In the following, we demonstrate a set of interesting failure examples. Figure l( a) plots the number of packets transmitted by a node every 15 minutes. During time period one, the value of this metric changes dramatically, possibly indicating that the node is faulty. However, a manual analysis of the whole trace shows that the node works well. On the other hand, even though the metric appears to be stable during period two, the node actually encounters routing loops (a fatal routing problem). This example demonstrates that the individual examination of metrics on the same sensor node may overlook silent failures, or may flag failures by mistake. Figure 1 (b) shows another example, where the data curves correspond to the packet transmissions of different nodes during the same period. Even though the metrics exhibit different values and variations, all three nodes in fact perform well, but the correlation among them is relatively weak. This example suggests that even if considering multiple sensor nodes, an individual metric is insufficient to uncover failures.
We then conduct the correlation matrix of the 22 metrics and visualize them using gray-scale images (the details of the correlation matrix will be presented later). A square (iJ) in the image denotes the correlation score between metrics i and j. Figure 2 (a)-(c) displays three images constructed from metrics of the same node. The node is normal in the first two periods, but faulty in the third one. Interestingly, the first two gray-scale images are very similar to each other, whereas they differ significantly from the third one. Analogous results are observed in the spatial domain as well. Figure 2 (d)-(f) shows the images of three nodes in the same period. The first two nodes are normal, while the third one is faulty. Observe that the first two images follow a similar pattern, which is clearly distinguishable from the last one. The difference of correlation patterns can be explained with the following example. There are two metrics called LoopCounter and SuccAckCounter. The former is the number of times the same packet passes through the current node, and the latter is the number of packets that are successfully transmitted by the current node. If the node is normal, the value of LoopCounter should be zero most of the time. Thus, these two metrics have weak correlation. If the node is out of order and produces "routing loops", the same packet passes multiple times. Eventually, LoopCounter dominates SuccAckCounter, and these two metrics are highly correlated, differentiating the faulty node from of the normal ones.
A. Correlation Graphs
In summary, proper diagnosis of WSNs, especially long term large-scale systems like GreenOrbs, is crucial and challenging. This is partially due to resource constraints and hardness to track in-network status. Even a more important, but often overlooked fact is that the diagnostic capacity is restricted by our incomplete knowledge of possible failures. Our experience with GreenOrbs reveals that independent investigation of metrics is insufficient for capturing all the problematic nodes. On the other hand, exploiting correlations of metrics uncovers significantly more failures.
III. AGNOSTIC DIAGNOSIS
We assume a WSN consisting of N sensor nodes. At each time stamp t, a sensor Si measures its working status, obtaining a status vector Si,t=(mI,t, m2,(, ... , mp,t), where p is the number of metrics and mu,tis the value of the u-th metric at time t, l::Su:Sp. Table 1 summarizes the symbols used in this paper and their meanings.
The correlation graph is a graph representing the pair wise correlations of the metrics. It is constructed and maintained periodically, for each node in the WSN. Figure 3 (a) illustrates the graph of a healthy node. Each edge has a weight, which denotes the correlation score between the corresponding metrics (weights of edges and some other vertices are omitted in our illustrations, for the sake of simplicity). In Figure 3 (b), the missing correlation between TransmitCounter and RadioOnTimeCounter suggests that this node might be faulty. 
Si,t
The p-dimensional status vector of sensor i at time t, Si,t=(mI,t, m2,t, ... , m v , J mu,t
The value of the u-th metric at time t, where 1 <u:Sp The correlation between metrics are evaluated in each time window k, which lasts from time (k-l)*w+l to time k*w, i.e.,
mu,k*w) and M",k=(mv,(k-l)*wl]' m",(k-l)*w IZ, ... , mv,t*w) are the values of metrics U and v collected in time window k respectively. We define the correlation score between them using Pearson's product-moment coefficient:
where (Ju,k and (Jv,k are their standard covariance
This correlation score falls within the range [-1,1]. The closer it is to either -lor 1, the stronger the correlation between the variables is. As it approaches zero, the correlation decreases. Thus, we can construct a matrix where each element Ck(U, v) is the correlation score between metric U and metric v:
This matrix is symmetric, i.e., Ck(U, V)=Ck(V,U), In addition, since each metric is perfectly correlated with itself, ck(u,u)=I.
The matrix is a representation of the correlation graph. In Figure 2 , the visualization of correlation matrix is achieved by transforming correlation scores into gray-scale values in the range of [0, 255] . Because the gray value of white is 255, lighter pixels correspond to more correlated metrics.
B. AD Framework
AD identifies anomalies in the temporal and spatial dimension. Specifically, temporal detection refers to sudden changes in the correlation graph of a node. Spatial detection discovers pattern inconsistencies using multiple nodes. If an anomaly is identified by both temporal and spatial detection, then it has a high chance of signifying a real problem.
Temporal detection investigates the evolution of correlation graphs over time. In every window (e.g., [I, ... ,w], [w+l, ... ,2 wD, a correlation graph of sensor Si is computed. If the system operates normally (i.e., no sensor nodes go out of order, and no events such as link failures, traffic congestions occur), the correlation graphs of the node should remain relatively stable. On the other hand, abrupt changes in consecutive graphs indicate silent failures.
Spatial detection investigates pattern differences in the graphs of nodes with similar characteristics. Although sensors are deployed in different areas and connected in an ad-hoc manner, they still share some intrinsic similarities. For instance, leaf nodes in the global routing tree only need to transmit data packets to their parents. The rest are intermediate nodes, which, in addition to their own data, forward packets originating in their sub-tree. Sensor nodes may share some similar patterns according to their roles in the network.
C. Temporal Detection
Given two consecutive correlation graphs CGi,k and CGi,k 11 of the same node (for successive time windows), an abrupt change may occur at one or more edges. For example, suppose that two metrics RadioTimeOn and TransmitCounter are highly correlated in CGih but not in CGik-l. Then, even if all the other edges are the sa � e, the change ' in correlation is regarded as abrupt. Therefore, we focus on the timely identification of such changes in individual edges. Given [17] to discover change points for time series. In our application, this includes three steps.
Step 1: Cumulative Sums Calculation. In this step, CUSUM charts are constructed based on the original time series. Let {Cl (U,V), C2( U, V), ... , cn(u,v)} be the correlation scores of edge (u, v) from the first time window to the current one. The cumulative sums CS(), CS1, CS2, ... , CSn are calculated as:
The intuition behind the cumulative sums is that if there are no abrupt changes in correlation scores, then the cumulative sums just shrink near zero. Supposing at the beginning all the scores are above the average, the term c,(u, v)-Ic,(u, v)/ n is always i=l larger than zero, causing cumulative sums CSi to increase steadily. If CH (U,V) is an abrupt change, CSH should be much smaller than CSk. Thus, CSk will dominate both the preceding and the subsequent cumulative sums. The change score is denoted as CSdi!Fmax(CSi)-min(CSi).
Step 2: Bootstrap Analysis. Bootstrap analysis provides a way to test the significance of the change by mimicking the behavior of CUSUM if there are no change points. In this step, the time series {c1(u,v),ciu,v), ... ,cn(u,v)} are reordered randomly. Based on the random ordered time series, a new sequence of cumulative sums CS'o, CS'j, CS'2> ... , CS'n are computed. The new change score is CS'difj = max( CS') mine CS';). After performing bootsraps M times, among which there are X times CSd!fi>CS'diffi the confidence level of CSdifJ is calculated as XlM.
Step 3: Change Point Detection. Once the confidence level of CSdifj is higher than a predefined threshold (e.g., 90%) , we say that an abrupt change happens in the current time series.
We select the index k so that CSk=maxICSil. Therefore, k is the last index before the abrupt change, and Ck+l (U,V) is the change point.
In Figure 4 , the original time series has an abrupt change in index 10. At the same position, the CUSUM curve encounters a sudden change, which is consistent with the original time series. However, in the CUSUM chats with random ordering, there is no sudden change, and all the curves tend to shrink near zero.
At the end of this step, the nodes whose correlation graphs change acutely are detected. However, they are not necessarily faulty, and are cross-validated by spatial detection.
D. Spatial Detection
Spatial detection takes snapshots of correlation graphs of all nodes in each time window, and groups similar ones together. Sensors whose correlation graphs diverge from the common patterns are considered suspicious. Problem 2. (Spatial Detection) Given a set of nodes Sj, S2> .
•. , Sm as well as their correlation graphs in window t, i.e., CGl,t, CG2,(, •.. , CGn,t, divide them into K clusters with cluster centroids C1 , C2> ... , CK. The confidence level for a sensor node Si to be suspicious is defined as:
where dist(CGx ,CGy) is the binary distance function between two correlation graphs.
Considering the symmetry of the correlation matrix, we can take the upper triangular of it and transform it to a d dimensional vector, where d=p·(p-l )/2. Therefore, an intuitive solution is to apply K-Means clustering [19] directly and find the farthest nodes from the centers. However, this approach is complicated and inefficient due to the high dimensionality of correlation graphs. For high dimensionality, the concept of distance becomes meaningless. Specifically, the difference of the maximum and minimum distance converges to zero [24] : Another problem is the dependencies among dimensions.
For instance, suppose metrics u, v, and ware highly correlated pair-wisely. As a result, the three dimensions c(u,v), c(u,w), c(u,w) are very likely to be dependent. This suggests that the actual dimensionality of the correlation graphs is much smaller than d. Accordingly, the projected data of X, is px" which is an m dimensional column vector in the low dimensional space, and the variance is:
where X = � Ix, = ( 00 ... 0)1 is the mean of projected data, and
. .
S=-L.,(X, -X)(X,
We can rewrite the variance PSpT as:
which implies that maxlmlzmg PSpT is equivalent to maximizing u{ Su, independently. Since Ui is a unit vector, a constraint is given by U , T U , = 1. As a common strategy, a Lagrange multiplier can be added to find the maxima of the objective function subject to constraints. The Lagrange function is defined by U{ SUi + Ai (1-u{ u,). When Su, = A,u" this term has a stationary point, i.e., the partial derivatives are zero, which suggests that u, is the eigenvector of S with eigenvalue A" Hence u; Su, = A i U; u , = A i ' If we take the largest eigenvalue and its corresponding eigenvector, U i T SU i is maximized. By induction, if we take the m largest eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors, the variance PSpT is maximized.
However, the commonly used methods to decompose eigenvectors of S (e.g., QR decomposition) have a computation cost of O(d\ which is not scalable with d. In our case, if we collect more status information, d increases in the form of a quadractic function of p, where p is the number of metrics. On the other hand, due to packet losses and the hardness of time synchronization, it is often difficult to ensure that in every time window, we can collect enough data to compute correlation graphs for each node. As a result, the number of correlation graphs to cluster is much smaller than, i.e., n«d. Based on this observation, our algorithm computes the eigenvectors of S in another way [20] . Substituting S in SU i = A , U i using S=n-I xX,
we have
n Then, after multiplying the equation by X in both sides, we obtain �XX(XU i ) = A , (X'U , ).
n It implies that the vector Vi= X Ui is the eigenvector of matrix �XTX.
n Moreover, the projected data matrix which lives in a m dimensional space can be directly computed based on Vi.
Denote the data matrix after projection as Z=[Zj, Z2> ... , Zn], where Zj is the corresponding data point of X, after projection, i.e., Zj=Px" and This implies that the data matrix after projection Z consists of eigenvectors of matrix � XT X. Since matrix XIX is of size n xn, n the computation cost of its eigenvalue decomposition process is O(n3) rather than O(eP).
After projection, we perform K-Means clustering on the columns of projected data matrix Z. The confidence of Zi to be suspicious is proportional to its distance to the nearest centroid. Note that K-Means clustering needs the number of clusters K beforehand. In our evaluation, we found that K = 3 works well when we set m = 15. A number of improvements such as QT clustering [23] have been proposed to remove this constraint. Another issue worth mentioning is that correlation graphs are constructed only in each time window, which yields a trade-off between detection delay and false alarm rate. If we set a long window, each node transmits a large amount of status data within the window, and the false alarm rate is low, at the cost of a long detection delay. On the contrary, if we set a short window, the detection delay is low, but more false alarms might be generated. 
IV. EVALUATION
We first present several case studies to show the effectiveness of Agnostic Diagnosis. Then, we study the relationship between the correlation graph changes and system performance. Finally, we statistically assess the results of our evaluation.
A. Case Studies
We use three months of data collected from 330 nodes in GreenOrbs. Using AD, we have identified four types of failures, some of which can be detected by the abnormal values of metrics, while others are silent ones.
The first type is called ingress drops, which is detected by the correlation between ReceiveCounter and TransmitCounter. Since the data rate of a sensor is fixed (i.e., three packets every fifteen minutes), the number of packets transmitted by a healthy node should be very close to the number of packets it receives from its children in the routing tree. However, if ingress drops occur, a portion of the incoming packets is dropped. Consequently, a change point in the time series of correlation score between ReceiveCounter and TransmitCounter suggests an ingress drop. Figure 5 illustrates the correlation scores of these two metrics over time. Since they are always positively correlated, the correlation scores are larger than O. In the diagram, there are four change points detected by temporal detection algorithm. Each of them is marked with a square, and the change point detected at 02:00 is the most significant one, i.e., with the highest confidence. An inspection of the raw data reveals that at that time, this sensor received packets from its children in the routing tree but did not forward all of them to the sink, causing ingress drops. However, if we investigate ReceiveCounter and TransmitCounter separately, this failure cannot be detected since the values of both metrics are within the normal range.
The second type is routing failures. A typical symptom is a node changing its parent too frequently. lighter pixels correspond to higher correlation scores. Node 73 has a quite different pattern compared to the others. As an example, consider the second pixel in the row, which corresponds to the correlation between ParentChangeCounter and RadioOnCounter. For healthy nodes 70 and 100, the two metrics are not correlated, as they signify the number of times a node turns on the radio and the number of times it changes its parent node in the routing tree, respectively. For node 73, the correlation score is so high that almost every time it turns on its radio, a parent change happens. Again, if we merely focus on the values of the two metrics independently, such failures cannot be found.
The third type is link failures. The detection of link failures exploits the correlation between RetransmitCounter and other metrics such as RadioOnTimeCounter. Figure 7 illustrates the time series of these two metrics. Initially, the metrics are weakly correlated, since a node may retransmit some packets when its radio is on, but it does not always happen. Starting at 8:30, the correlation increases, indicating that a large portion of radio-on time is used to retransmit packets. Thus, the transmission from this node to its parent suffers from low link quality. On the other hand, it is difficult to simply set a threshold for the ratio of retransmitted packets because it may change depending on the time and the location. For instance, a threshold equal to 0.5 may be acceptable in an indoor environment where links are easily interfered, but too low in an open space where link quality is very good. The fourth kind refers to node failures that may be caused by software or hardware problems. The correlation between TaskPostCounter and TaskExecuteCounter can be employed to uncover the internal status of programs. Generally speaking, if the node is healthy, the number of tasks performed (i.e., TaskExecuteCounter) should be highly correlated with the number of tasks posted (i.e., TaskPostCounter). However, if bugs occur, this correlation tends to be weak. We do not address hardware failures because they can be readily detected through a simple rule: when a node crashes, none of its neighbors can know its existence any more. Thus, if the node does not appear in the neighborhood of nearby sensors, it is highly possible that it has crashed.
B. Effectiveness
To evaluate the effectiveness of our agnostic approach we investigate data manually and compare them with the results of our system. Temporal Detection: We depict both packet delivery ratios (PDR) and temporal detection results in Figure 8 . PDR is defined as the ratio between the amount of packets received by the sink and that sent by the source node. For each square, its x-axis value corresponds to the time when the temporal detection phase reports change points, while its y-axis value corresponds to the packet delivery ratio at that time.
When failures occur to a sensor or its links, a possible symptom is that the node suffers from low packet delivery ratio. Local minima in the PDR curve are captured by the squares, suggesting that low PDRs correspond to the time instants when temporal detection discovers change points in the node's correlation graphs. However, some local minima are not captured by squares, possibly because they do not necessarily signify failures. For example, if node s is healthy but its parent is faulty, it also causes node s's PDR to encounter a local minimum. Moreover, if the sensor recovers from a temporary failure, temporal detection also captures these time instants, i.e., the red squares that correspond to local maxima of PDR curve.
Spatial Detection: To validate the effectiveness of spatial detection, we randomly pick 30 faulty nodes that are identified in this phase. Specifically, 23 of them are flagged because some failures take place, 5 are false alarms, and the other 2 nodes exhibit a sudden increase in the number of packets received, leading to different correlation scores between PacketReceiveCounter and other metrics. However, after manually inspecting the raw data, we believe that these two nodes are healthy since the number of packets transmitted by them increases accordingly. The involved faults include packet loops, frequent parent changes, link failures, mismatch between radio-on time and packets transmitted/received, ingress failures, and stack overflows. These failures are not independent because several types of failures may occur in the same sensor node simultaneously. Packet loops is the most frequent type of failures.
C.
Trajji c Overhead
Since our diagnostic approach is a proactive one, it incurs additional traffic overhead. In our implementation, the packets storing these metrics are sent back to the base station along with the sensing data packets. Every fifteen minutes, all the status information can be packed in one packet, which is reasonable considering the benefits of diagnosis.
v.
RELATED WORKS
Diagnosis of wireless sensor networks has been tackled from various perspectives. The first type aims at software debugging. Clairvoyant [1] is a GDB-like source-level tool that provides a suit of standard debugging commands such as break, set, watch and backtrace. Declarative Tracepoint [2] supports a declarative, SQL-like language, allowing developers to insert a set of action-associated rules to applications at runtime. DustMiner [3] employs a front-end to collect runtime event logs and a back-end to perform frequent pattern mining to uncover root causes of failures and performance anomalies. Our approach differs in that we do not aim at debugging the source code. Instead, our goal is to discover the silent failures caused by nodes, ambient environment, and protocols.
The second type of diagnosis is achieved through rule-based mmmg, or specific inference models. Sympathy [4] periodically collects general system metrics such as nodes' next hops and neighbors. Decision trees are then used to analyze root causes of node failures. PAD [8] leverages a packet marking strategy for constructing and maintaining the inference model. PowerTracing [9] employs a special power meter and HMM to identifY patterns of power consumption. Our work addresses the problem when there is little domain knowledge. Besides, since no specific models are assumed in our system, it has wider applicability.
There are also works closely related to diagnosis [10] [13] . For example, [11] and [12] focus on node failures. LiveNet uses passive monitoring to reconstruct dynamics of live sensor networks. PD2 [14] pinpoints the root causes of application performance problems. SNMS [5] proposes a network management system designed for wireless sensor networks. Both MinRoute [6] and EmStar [7] visualize the operational sensor network.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Most existing methods rely on pre-defined rules to discover faults with known types and symptoms. On the other hand, our experience with a large-scale sensor network reveals that diagnosis should be agnostic so as to discover silent failures. This paper presents Agnostic Diagnosis, a novel approach that relies on minimum domain knowledge. AD explores the correlation between system metrics using a two-stage cross validation scheme to detect silent failures. Our evaluation, based on a dataset collected from 330 nodes over several months, demonstrates that the two stages indeed capture system performance degradation and discover potential failures and network events.
